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1.0  Introduction 
The operation of the Canadian dairy industry is extremely complex and highly 
regulated (Goldfarb).  However, its essential features entail: 1) farm level milk prices 
based on a cost of production formula
1; 2) classified pricing, by end use, of milk 
purchased for processing; 3) production quotas designed to supply all the milk and dairy 
products the domestic market requires at the formula price; and 4) high import tariffs to 
keep foreign dairy products, above Canada’s WTO minimum access commitments, from 
entering the domestic market. Our study is focused on the Ontario dairy market which 
supplies approximately 32 percent of Canada’s raw milk.   
The Dairy Famers of Ontario (DFO) regulate the production and marketing of 
milk in Ontario. One of their prime responsibilities is to establish the rules and 
regulations that apply to the transfer of milk production quota among dairy producers.
2  
The value of production quota has been a controversial aspect of supply management 
since its inception (Barichello and Cunningham-Dunlop, 1987).  In the early years of 
supply management attempts were made to keep the value of quota at zero – i.e. what the 
original recipients paid for it.  However, it soon became evident that trying to deny that 
quota was a valuable asset was impossible.  As a result in, March 1980 the DFO 
established an exchange where production quota could be traded amongst willing buyers 
and sellers, allowing the market to freely determine its price.   The DFO states that the 
objectives of the exchange are to (DFO, web site): 
                                                 
1 Although it is often stated that milk prices are based on a cost of production formula this is not entirely 
correct since changes in personal disposable income and changes in the consumer price index receive 60 
percent of the weight in the formula used to set the price of table milk and cream while industrial milk 
prices are determined by the Canadian Dairy Commission in a different fashion (Goldfarb). 
 
2 You must be an active milk producer to own quota.    2 
  Provide an equal opportunity for all producers to buy and sell quota; 
  Operate independently and with a minimum of DFO involvement; 
  Reflect the value or upper value limit of quota at all times; 
  Not be subject to manipulation or exploitation; and 
  Be the most cost-efficient quota transfer system at the least possible cost. 
Economists have been frequent critics of supply management, beginning with 
reports by the Economic Council of Canada (Barichello 1981; Forbes, Hughes and 
Warley) in the early 1980’s and extending to recent reports by Goldfarb, and Robson and 
Busby because of the large transfers of income from consumers to producers and 
significant welfare losses.  Still most economists would agree that, given supply 
management, an open and transparent production quota transfer mechanism is a positive 
aspect of the milk marketing system. 
Figure 1 shows that, in constant 2006 dollars, a unit of production quota was 
worth about $15,000/unit in the mid-1990’s.
3  At that point the value of production quota 
exploded reaching more than $30,000/unit in 2004, an annual average increase of 11.7 
percent per year in real terms.  The reasons for this rapid rise in quota values will be 
discussed later but the increase caused the DFO to intervene on two occasions; each time 
instituting a major change in quota transfer policy designed to slow or halt the growth in 
the value of production quota.  It is these policies that are the primary focus of this paper.  
First, in November 2006 the Progressive Transfer Assessment levied a variable in-kind 
tax on producers selling quota on the exchange (also known as the pay-what-you-bid 
                                                 
3 A unit of quota allows a milk producer to deliver one kilogram of butterfat per day and this is roughly 
equal to the annual milk (butterfat) production of an average dairy cow.   3 
provision).  This policy allowed producers purchasing quota on the exchange to freely bid 
the price they were willing to pay for a unit of quota and to specify the quantity they were 
willing to buy at that price; at the same time an in-kind tax was imposed on the quantity 
of quota sellers put on the exchange, in order to impose a ceiling on the price they 
received at $25,500/unit of quota.  The idea behind establishing this policy was that 
purchasers would recognize that the resale value of the quota was restricted.  It was felt 
that this change in quota policy would be sufficient to reduce bid prices over time, as 
producers began to realize that the capital gains previously experienced from quota 
ownership had dissipated.  As illustrated in Figure 1, while this policy change halted the 
rapid escalation of prices on the exchange at around $30,000/unit, it failed to achieve the 
anticipated result of sufficiently lowering the price to the resale value of $25,500 per unit.  
In response, in August 2009 the quota system was changed again to impose a ceiling 
price on quota of $25,500, with scheduled monthly reductions to $25,000/unit by January 
2010.  Under this system buyers will pay and sellers will receive $25,000 per unit of 
quota (after January 2010) if the ceiling price remains binding and less if it is not binding. 
In the next section we review the basic welfare economics of supply management 
and quota transfer mechanisms.  We then turn to a discussion of the factors driving milk 
quota price increases and to an explanation of the motivation of the DFO in first taxing 
quota transfers and then imposing a price ceiling.  Following this in section 4 we conduct 
welfare analysis of the milk quota market and then conclude with some observations on 
the implications for milk production in Ontario.    
2.0 Production Quota Value Basics    4 
  Figure 2 will be familiar to all students of supply management where Sm 
represents the supply curve for milk, Dm the demand for milk at the farm gate, and Pmo 
and Qmo the equilibrium price and quantity.  If Pmd is the formula price of milk then 
output has to be reduced to Qmd to achieve this price.  However, at Qmd the marginal cost 
of production is Pms and its demand price is Pmd.  Consequently, a producer is willing to 
pay up to Pmd-Pms for the right to produce milk at a marginal cost of Pms and to sell it at 
Pmd.  The difference Pmd-Pms is the rental rate of quota (Rm) and it can be split into the 
supply-restricting portion of the rental rate (Pmo-Pms) and the price raising part of the 
rental rate (Pmd-Pmo).  Knowledge of the elasticity of milk demand and supply and the 
amount by which output is reduced from its equilibrium level would allow the value of 
Rm to be estimated.  However, due to the prolonged existence of supply management, the 
free market values of milk, Pmo and Qmo, are not observable and have to be implicitly 
derived.  In addition, DFO regulations do not allow milk quota to be rented so all that can 
be observed in the market place is the capitalized value of the annual stream of benefits. 
  The simplest capital asset pricing model states that the value of an asset (CV) is 
equal to the expected benefit stream (R) divided by the producer’s discount rate r as 
shown in equation 1. 
CV = R/r        (1) 
  We will return to this formula shortly but at this point it is important to note that 
we have one equation and two unknowns, R and r.  The literature contains numerous 
innovative attempts to calculate either R or r, in the dairy industry, in order to obtain an 
estimate of the other variable but regardless of the method used the point estimates have   5 
to be considered with some caution.
4  Nonetheless, given an estimate of R welfare 
analysis is possible and referring to Figure 2 the deadweight loss of supply management 
is area (c+d) and in the typical study the welfare analysis is concluded at this point.  
However, an implicit assumption contained in Figure 2 is that all producers in the 
industry are producing at a marginal cost of Pms, and this implies that production quota is 
efficiently allocated.  Even with a well functioning auction market this is a strong 
assumption given that quota was initially allocated on an historical basis, there are a 
number of regulations that inhibit the movement of quota and unless cost reducing 
technologies are adopted simultaneously by all producers there will always be producers 
with too much or too little quota.  It is easily shown that if there are no restrictions on 
transfers and quota is misallocated among producers it will be traded until its value 
reaches the rental rate (R) determined in the milk market.   
In the next section we examine the factors that seem to be driving the quota 
market and the DFO’s reaction to them. 
2.1 Valuing Production Quota    
The first step in providing a deeper understanding of current quota values is to 
expand equation (2) following Barichello (1996) to get: 
CV = E(R)/r-g       (3) 
Where E(R) is the expected value of R, r is the discount rate which incorporates a 
premium for systematic risk, and g is the expected rate of growth in E(R) over time. 
                                                 
4 Chen and Meilke; and Meilke, Sarker and LeRoy contain discussions of the different methods used by 
researchers to obtain marginal cost estimates.   6 
Barichello’s (1996) major innovation was to incorporate “policy risk” into the estimate of 
the expected value of the stream of future returns as shown in equation 4: 
E(R) = (1-j) R – j CV      (4) 
Policy risk, represented by (j), is the probability that quota rents under supply 
management will end, hence the expected value of the future stream of annual rents has 
to be multiplied by the probability of them continuing minus the likelihood that the value 
of the capital asset itself might fall to zero. Barichello (1996) argues that defining policy 
risk in this way implies it cannot be diversified or insured against.
5    
Incorporating equation (4) into (3) and simplifying gives: 
CV = R(1-j) / (r-g+j)      (5) 
Comparing equation (5) to equation (1) it appears the problem has become compounded 
because we now have one equation and four unknowns.  Still the increased richness of 
equation (5) allows us to discuss the probable time path of each variable and its 
implications for the capitalized value of quota. 
As stated earlier there are many obstacles to calculating the rental value of 
production quota.  We use a simple method and then examine the implications of using 
                                                 
5 Barichello (1996) suggests that one way for the industry to minimize policy risk is to engage in lobbying 
activities and the supply managed industries have been very active in this area.  From a political economy 
perspective it is easy to understand why the supply managed industries have been able to maintain the 
backing of all four of the political Parties represented in Canada’s Parliament.  So successful that the House 
of Commons unanimously adopted a motion giving Canada’s WTO negotiators a mandate to “...at the end 
of the current round of negotiations Canada obtains results that ensure that the supply management sectors 
are subject to no reduction in over-quota tariffs and no increase in tariff quotas, ...” (House of Commons).   7 
different values.  Table 1 shows the deflated “mail box” prices of milk received by 
farmers in Ontario from 1994 to 2009.
6  In real terms these prices have been quite 
constant generally ranging between $64/hl and $67/hl over the sample period.  Marginal 
cost estimates were obtained from the Ontario Dairy Farm Accounting Project, an annual 
survey of Ontario dairy farms conducted by the Canadian Dairy Commission and the 
DFO.
7  The direct cash cost components (per hl) of the survey serve as our estimate of the 
marginal cost of milk production.  However, a shortcoming of the survey is that the cost 
of home grown feed is valued at its cost of production rather than at its market price.  
This tends to make the feed cost component of marginal costs more stable than if spot 
feed prices were used due to market variability.  Taking 2006 as an example, our 
calculated marginal cost is $31.39/hl, out of total costs of $46.90/hl of which $11.84/hl is 
the cost of producing feed.  Subtracting our marginal cost estimate from the mail box 
price of milk gives our estimate of the rental rate of quota in 2006 of $34.97 (table 1).  
Examination of the estimated rental values from 1994 to 2008 shows that most of the 
values range between $32/hl and $34/hl.  In the capital asset pricing model we also need 
an estimated growth rate g in the rental values.  Based on the figures in Table 1 any 
growth rate between zero and two percent could be justified but in our empirical model 
we set the growth rate at one percent.   
In estimating the discount rate (r) we have selected the prime interest rate plus 
two percentage points as being indicative of what dairy farmers are paying for the money 
                                                 
6 The mail box price is the price per hectolitre that a farmer receives for their milk production after all 
deductions are taken into account.  Table 1 also provides a comparison of the mail box price and the target 
price for milk. 
 
7 The average direct costs reported in the survey are essentially average costs but for this analysis we have 
assumed they provide an adequate measure of marginal costs.   8 
they borrow to purchase quota.  There has been a gradual decline in interest rates since 
1994 punctuated by a few upward spikes along the way (Table 1).  In addition, over the 
study period there has been a significant expansion in the credit available to dairy farmers 
buying quota.  This can be attributed to two factors: 1) the DFO’s issuing Letters of 
Direction; and 2) institutional changes at Farm Credit Canada (FCC).  First, Letters of 
Direction are formal agreements which an individual producer enters into voluntarily 
with the DFO and permits the DFO to arbitrate loans between a financial institution and 
the producer.  Essentially the Letter of Direction establishes the institution who has 
loaned money, to buy quota, as the first creditor to be paid in the case of payment 
problems.  If a farmer in financial difficulty sells their quota or goes bankrupt, the Letter 
of Direction legally freezes the revenue from the sale until the lending institution has 
been paid.  It acts as credit insurance for the lender.  Coupled with consistently escalating 
quota values, the Letter of Direction greatly reduced the chance of a loan default and 
financial institutions responded by permitting loans which used the existing quota 
holdings of a producer as collateral beginning in the mid-1990’s (DFO, 2009b). 
A second factor influencing credit availability is the institutional shift which 
occurred in 1996 within the FCC.  As a crown corporation, prior to 1996, the FCC 
received its budget from the federal government, and loans were bounded by its annual 
allocation of funds.  However, between 1996 and 2008, the government changed this 
practice, choosing to allow the FCC to borrow on the open market.  This may have 
altered the FCC lending practices as dairy farmers could easily be perceived as ideal 
borrowers because of the use of quota as collateral and institutionalized policies (Letters 
of Direction) reducing the risk of default(DFO 2009b).  In July 2008, the federal Minister   9 
of Finance reinstated the original conditions and the FCC stopped borrowing from the 
market and once again began to receive its budget from the federal government. 
These changes in lending practices are difficult to capture in the capital asset 
pricing model but there is no question they put upward pressure on quota values.  In our 
later calculations it will show-up as a reduction in policy risk.  It also justifies using 
prime plus two percent as the discount rate since these loans are quite safe from the 
lenders perspective.   
  The final element in the capital asset pricing model is the policy risk variable (j).  
We will provide estimates of this variable based on the data in Table 1 but it might be 
useful to think about its likely magnitude.  In some of the early work on supply 
management large discount rates (which include policy risk) were estimated.  For 
example, Barichello’s (1996) estimates placed the annual average discount rate in Ontario 
at 30 percent between 1980 and 1991.
8  It seems likely that policy risk remained fairly 
high in the early 1990’s because of the on-going Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  
Following the tabling of the Dunkel Draft Text, in 1991, it was clear that import quotas 
for agricultural products were going to be tariffied but it was unclear what this would 
mean for Canada’s supply managed commodities (WTO).  However, following the 
completion of the negotiations in December 1993 it became clear that over-quota tariff 
rates, in the tariff rate quota scheme implemented, would be sufficiently high enough to 
prevent the importation of foreign dairy products and that any new import access created 
by the agreement would be minimal.  Hence, beginning in the mid-1990’s there was an 
                                                 
8 Barichello’s estimates used dairy years (August to July), whereas to facilitate the importance of declining 
annual interest rates the data was recalculated into calendar years.   10 
accumulation of factors whose collective influence put upward pressure on milk quota 
prices despite the slow growth in the rental rate for quota.  They are: 1) declining interest 
rates; 2) the Letter of Direction that changed lending practices for quota purchases and 
removed credit constraints; 3) easier credit availability at the FCC; and 4) the conclusion 
of the multilateral trade negotiations that insured that domestic milk producers were 
protected from cheap foreign products for at least another 15 years.  This coupled with 
the maturity of the supply management system, its political support and the likelihood 
that it would not face major changes following the conclusion of the Doha Round (when 
ever, and if ever, that occurs) all served to lower policy risk to levels lower than 
previously experienced.    
3.0  The Quota Exchange and the Role of Speculation 
Technological advances, additions to barn space, and expansion in the average 
size of dairy herds all increase the industry’s productive capacity and the need for milk 
production quota.  This is the foundation of the demand-side for quota on the quota 
exchange.  In theory, the most efficient producers will seek to acquire more production 
quota so that they can expand output and minimize underutilized capacity (Mussell, 
Sparling, & Oginskyy). 
In contrast, producer life-cycles are the dominant force determining the supply-
side of the exchange during a given period (DFO, 2009b).  Thus, the number of retirees 
and producers voluntarily exiting the industry in a given month will influence the amount 
of quota supplied to the exchange.  The rapid increases in quota prices may have 
provided an additional incentive for existing producers to hang on to their quota, just as it 
would for any investor holding an asset with a rapidly advancing price.     11 
The DFO viewed the rapidly escalating quota prices with some alarm.  There are 
a number of reasons for this.  First, the optics of ever increasing quota values is not good.  
With the cost of quota for a modest 100 cow dairy herd reaching $3 million it is hard to 
argue that the system is saving the small family farm.  Second, in-family transfers and 
secession planning become difficult with so much value attached to quota and the 
requirement that the dairy farm has to be operated by the quota holder. Third, those 
efficient producers wishing to expand into fairly large operations (300 to 600 cows) may 
have trouble raising the millions of dollars required to do so.  Fourth, new entrants are 
essentially blocked from starting dairy operations as a result of the high quota prices, 
effectively creating a gentry of dairy producers and their families.  Fifth, the non-supply 
managed sectors of agriculture have actively criticized supply management, claiming that 
the system permits dairy farmers to leverage their quota holdings in order to purchase 
land at prices cash crop farmers cannot afford.  Finally, the DFO had a strong belief that 
there was a speculative element and “irrational exuberance” influencing quota values that 
was not healthy for either the dairy sector or for individual producers should the “bubble” 
burst.   
As a result the DFO took action to address what in their view were unsustainably 
high quota values.  We turn to these policies in sections 3.1 and 3.2 but before doing so it 
is interesting to see if the capital asset pricing model can shed any light on the question of 
whether there has been excessive speculation in the dairy quota market. 
Let’s start with 2006 when quota values peaked at $321.67/hl ($29799.71/unit) as 
shown in Table 1.
9  In 2006 our calculated rental rate is $34.97/hl.  If the growth rate of 
                                                 
9 Since our costs and returns are measured in dollars per hectolitre we had to convert the annual cost of 
quota, per unit, to the cost per hectolitre of milk.  This requires dividing the per unit real quota price   12 
the rental value is set equal to the five year annual average increase (2002-2006) it is 2.1 
percent, but this value is highly dependent on the years included in the sample so a more 
conservative estimate of one percent is chosen for this example.  The interest rate in 2006 
is 6.1 percent. Using these values and equation (6) you can solve for policy risk of 5.2 
percent in 2006.  A value that does not seem unreasonable to the authors and significantly 
smaller than the estimates for the 1980’s (Barichello, 1996). 
j =  (R – CV(r – g))/ (CV + R)    (6) 
To continue the experiment, look at 1995 and assume that all of the figures 
calculated for 2006 are the same (including policy risk at 5.2 percent) except for the 
discount rate which was 9.1 percent in 1995.  In this case the calculated value of quota is 
$249.26/hl compared to the actual value of $165.57/hl, a 50.5 percent undervaluation if 
policy risk was 5.2 percent.
10  To generate the actual quota value policy risk would have 
had to be 10.7 percent. 
  The trade-offs among the rental rate and the capitalized value of quota are 
illustrated in Figure 3.  In Figure 3, capitalized quota values are shown on the vertical 
axis and rental rates on the horizontal axis.  The three lines in Figure 3 differ by the value 
of policy risk (r = 0.06 and g = 0.01 are held constant along each line) ranging from four 
percent along the top line, five percent along the middle line and six percent along the 
bottom line.  A $2/hl increase (decrease) in the rental rate raises (lowers) the capitalized 
value of quota by $1966/unit, $1751/unit and $1576/unit along the 4, 5, and 6 percent 
                                                                                                                                                 
($29,799.71/unit in 2006) by 365 to obtain the daily price paid for quota ($81.64 per day/unit).  This was 
then multiplied by the annual average of the monthly provincial butterfat tests for each year (1994-2009) to 
obtain an estimate for the price of quota per hectolitre of milk ($321.66/hl in 2006).  
 
10 The undervaluation of quota is even higher (64 percent) if the rental rate ($38.23/hl) calculated for 1995 
is used instead of the 2006 value ($34.97/hl). 
   13 
policy risk lines respectively. Conversely, at a rental value of $28/hl a drop in policy risk 
from six percent to five percent raises the capitalized value of quota by $2463/unit and 
from five percent to four percent by $3011/unit; at a $32/hl rental rate the corresponding 
changes in capitalized quota value are $2816/unit and $3441/unit.  Hence, the larger the 
rental rate the larger the impact on quota values from a change in policy risk (or the 
discount rate).  Figure 3 demonstrates how responsive quota values are to interest rates, 
policy risk and rental rates.          
  The discussion above leads us to a different conclusion than the DFO with respect 
to quota values.  The rapidly rising quota values between 1995 and 2006 do not appear to 
represent excessive speculation, instead they appear to be the  
rational outcome of declining interest rates, declining policy risk and a “catch-up” in  
quota values with their intrinsic value as credit constraints were eliminated.
11 
  However, in one important sense the cause of the rapid increase in quota values is 
immaterial.  When interest rates increase quota values can fall quite rapidly (Figure 3), 
especially if perceived policy risk increases at the same time as might happen if the Doha 
Round is concluded.
12  With quota fully priced in our view, or overpriced in the view of 
the DFO, rising interest rates world have serious consequences for dairy producers who 
are highly leveraged.
13    
                                                 
11 An alternative hypothesis is that we have grossly overestimated rental rates.  In 1995, with r = 0.091, g = 
0.01 and j = 0.052 to generate a quota value of $165.57/hl would require the rental rate to be $23.23/hl 
about one-third less than the $34.97/hl used in our experiment.  This would imply that the marginal cost of 
milk production is $41-$43/hl a value we find unrealisticly high.  For comparison purposes C$42/hl equals 
US$18.48/cwt a price that would be considered “high” in the United States market.   
 
12 Since the cost of capital cannot fall below zero it is a question of when interest rates will rise, not if they 
will rise. 
13 How highly leveraged dairy farms are depends on what value you put on quota but should it fall to zero 
many dairy farms would be insolvent. In 2002, for larger dairy farms (sales greater than $500,000) the ratio   14 
  We now turn to a description of the policies the DFO adopted to try and constrain 
quota price increases.   
3.1 A Progressive Transfer Assessment 
  A progressive transfer assessment policy was adopted in November 2006, it 
utilized a variable in-kind tax on the quantity of quota put on the quota exchange to 
restrict the price received by farmers selling quota at $25,500/unit.  This was 
implemented through a pay-what-you-bid provision in which buyers compete for quota 
on the exchange, and if they are successful pay their bid price.  As shown in Figure 4 
with Rs = $25,500/unit the progressive transfer assessment affects the amount of quota 
that sellers are willing to put on the exchange.  At first glance the policy appears to be 
counterproductive because the quantity sold on the exchange declines and selling prices 
increase from their free market level.   However, if there is a speculative element in the 
bid prices for quota the cap on the price of future sales at $25,500 might shift the demand 
curve for quota sufficiently to the left to lower bid prices to, or below, the ceiling price. 
In short, the underlying assumption governing the introduction of the progressive transfer 
assessment was that speculation in quota was an important driver of quota values and 
putting a ceiling on the resale price would help to deflate the expectation of future capital 
gains.       
  As shown in figure 4, in the absence of a policy intervention, the equilibrium 
quota price would be R, resulting in consumer surplus equal to (a + b + e) and producer 
surplus equal to (c+d+f) .  As a result of the transfer assessment the quantity sold on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of farm debt to non-quota equity exceeds one for Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec (1.1, 1.1, and 1.2, 
respectively) (Mussell, et. al. 2005). 
   15 
exchange declines from Qe to Qd, decreasing producer surplus to (d) and consumer 
surplus to (a).  Under this policy the transfer assessment is (b + c).   The in-kind tax on 
sellers imposes a dead weight loss in efficiency equal to (e + f).  The value of the 
deadweight loss depends on the supply and demand elasticities of the excess supply and 
excess demand curves for quota and the size of the in-kind tax. 
  On the demand-side, producers seeking to purchase quota face no direct 
restrictions, allowing competition among producers to allocate the quota available for 
sale to the highest bidders. 
  Finally, it is important to acknowledge the distributional effects of this policy.  In 
figure 4, area (b + c) represents the value of the quota acquired by the DFO under the 
progressive tax assessment.  This accumulated quota is then redistributed amongst all 
active producers engaged in dairy production relative to their current quota holdings, 
regardless of whether they participate on the quota exchange during that period.  Thus, 
this policy results in a welfare transfer from producers participating on the exchange to 
the collective dairy sector.   
3.2   The Price Cap System 
  In July 2009, the DFO changed their quota transfer policy from a progressive 
transfer assessment to a firm price ceiling.  This decision appears to have been driven by 
the successful adoption of a price cap on dairy quota in Quebec (which set its price 
ceiling at around $30,000/unit); a number of legal actions by Ontario dairy producers 
arguing they should not have to pay the progressive transfer assessment (Ontario Ministry 
of Agriculture Food and Rural Affairs); and the fact that bid prices for quota had not 
dropped significantly with the progressive transfer tax.     16 
Under this policy, the price ceiling, at Rs = $25,500/unit illustrated in Figure 4 
applies to both buyers and sellers of quota and consequently there is no market 
mechanism to allocate the quota offered for sale.  Consequently, any milk producer 
whose marginal costs justify a bid price greater than $25,500/unit is foolish not to bid for 
quota.  As shown in Figure 4 the demand for quota at $25,500 is Qf and the quantity 
offered for sale is Qd and there is a shortage of quota equal to Qf-Qd at that price.
14   
  Figure 4 illustrates the welfare implications of fixing the price on the exchange.  
Instituting a price ceiling at $25,500/unit reduces producer surplus to (d), while consumer 
surplus becomes (a + b +c).  This also leads to a deadweight loss equal to (e + f) the same 
as with the progressive transfer assessment.  Seemingly, producers purchasing quota are 
the dominant beneficiaries of the policy change while sellers are no worse off than under 
the progressive transfer assessment.  However, under the progressive tax assessment the 
available quota is purchased by producers willing to pay the highest price; in contrast 
under price ceiling any producer with a reservation price above the ceiling price should 
bid and there is no market based way to allocate the quota.  As a result the DFO had to 
ration the available quota among all the producers who bid for quota.
15   
3.3 Stalemate 
                                                 
14 The ceiling price began at $25,500/unit in August 2009 and was scheduled to decline to $25,000/unit by 
January 2010.  For simplicity, the ceiling price in our analysis is fixed at $25,500. 
   
15 If the quantity demanded on the exchange exceeds the quantity supplied, the DFO allocates 0.1 Kg. of 
quota to each successfully bidding producer for a minimum of 50 percent of the quota supplied (DFO, 
2009).  Then remaining quota available is distributed amongst those producers bidding on the exchange 
who have not completely acquired the quantity of quota listed in their bid.  It is then distributed 
proportionately to the quantity that each individual producer has demanded.  The primary restriction limits 
the size of the bid to no more than 10 percent of their quota holdings at the time.  While this method may 
be equitable, it is highly inefficient.   
   17 
  As this paper is being written, in April 2010, the Ontario dairy quota exchange 
has essentially been shut down by thousands of producers bidding for quota on the 
exchange and little or no quota being offered for sale.
16  As predicted, by January 2010 
there was a severe shortage of quota available on the exchange, which could not even 
facilitate the first round of distribution (0.1 kg per bid) as called for under the new policy.  
This has resulted in discontent among producers who are frustrated by their inability to 
purchase quota.  As a result criticism has arisen, blaming both the New Entrant Quota 
Assistance Program (NEQAP), and the DFO’s inability to sufficiently expand the 
demand for milk at a rate which would permit an increase in the aggregate quota 
(Anderson; DFO, 2009a).
17     
In most markets where there are binding price ceilings a “black market” will 
develop to allow cagey individuals to circumvent the controls.  A well known example is 
the offering of “key money” in markets where apartment rental rates are held artificially 
low.  Another example is the unofficial black market currency exchanges in developing 
countries with overvalued official exchange rates.  So, how can dairy producers 
circumvent the price ceiling on the dairy quota exchange?  The most obvious way is to 
buy an ongoing dairy which includes the land, barn, cows and quota.  However, because 
it is so obvious and the DFO wants at least some quota to be sold on the exchange, in 
                                                 
16 The February 2010 quota exchange was canceled after one out of five existing producers placed a bid for 
quota and no one got any in the January exchange (Anderson). 
 
17 Established in August 2009, the New Entrant Quota Assistance Program (NEQAP) is designed to assist 
new producers enter the industry.  As such, some of the quota offered for sale on the exchange is set aside 
for the NEQAP.  Applicants for the NEQAP cannot have produced or be the spouse of someone who has 
previously produced milk in Canada.  Furthermore, each applicant must present a ten year financial plan 
certified by an qualified third party, coupled with a letter from a financier or lender stating its intention to 
finance future expansion of the operation.  After the successful issuing of a license and an approved order 
to issue quota from the DFO, up to ten applicants are selected.  Each successful applicant is allocated up to 
12 units of quota (DFO 2009a).   18 
March 2010 the DFO announced a number of quota transfer policy revisions (DFO, 
2010b).  With respect to on-going dairy farm operations the seller must have produced 
milk continuously for five years to be eligible to sell the farm as an on-going operation.  
Purchasers of on-going operations are : 1) required to purchase the dairy facilities and 
associated land base in order to obtain the quota; 2) purchasers cannot relocate the quota 
for five years; and 3) the purchased quota can never be merged with quota on another 
licence to produce or market milk.  In addition, the DFO reaffirmed the policy that quota 
cannot be rented.   
Since the DFO must approve all requests to transfer or acquire quota it appears 
they can make the above regulations stick, although the cost in terms of transaction costs 
and lost efficiency can be very high if producers continue to withhold quota from the 
exchange.  There are also restrictions on the transfer of quota from a parent to a child at a 
different location, although transfers to a child at the same location seem to remain 
unrestricted.  We will return to the quota transfer rules in section 5 but in the next section 
we provide some empirical evidence on the cost of restrictive quota transfer policies.        
4.0 Modelling the Quota Transfer Market 
  In order to quantify the effects of the quota policies a simple linear, synthetic 
model of the Ontario quota exchange calibrated to 2007 data (table 1) was constructed.  
The calibration to 2007 data was selected because it was the first full year after the 
imposition of the transfer assessment policy (November 2006 – July 2009).   
  The model contains two equations: the excess supply curve for quota and the 
excess demand curve for quota.  In order to calibrate the model estimates of the excess 
supply and excess demand elasticities for Ontario dairy quota are required.  Lambert et al.   19 
address the price responsiveness of the excess supply and excess demand and provides 
estimates of (-5) for the demand elasticity and (10) for the supply elasticity.  Although 
these estimates seem quite elastic, after the imposition of the progressive transfer 
assessment the volume of quota sold on the exchange declined from approximately 4.7 
percent of the total stock of quota to around 2.5 percent in 2006 and 2007 (Mussell, 
Sparling and Oginskyy).  This substantial decline (approximately 50 percent) in the 
volume traded suggests that the excess supply and excess demand curves for quota are in 
fact quite elastic and that the elasticity estimates reported in Lambert et al. (1995) provide 
a reasonable starting point for our model.
18    
The demand elasticity is imposed at the annual average bid price on the quota 
exchange in 2007 ($28, 653) and the supply elasticity at the ceiling price ($25,500). Both 
are calibrated to the total quantity of quota traded in 2007 of 6892.8 kilograms.  
Equations 7 and 8 are the excess supply (ESq) and excess demand (EDq) curves for quota 
used in the analysis where Pq is the market clearing price of quota. 
ESq = -61,957.2 + 2.70 Pq      (7) 
EDq = 41,276.4  – 1.20 Pq      (8) 
Based on these two curves the unrestricted equilibrium price for quota in 2007 
would have been $26,470 and 9,512 kilograms of quota would have traded.  Hence, the 
equilibrium price was only marginally (3.8 percent) above the initial price ceiling but at 
the equilibrium price 40 percent more quota (9,512 kg vs. 6,892.3 kg) would have been 
traded. 
 
                                                 
18 Alternative elasticity estimates were utilized to see how robust our reported results are with respect to the 
elasticity assumptions.  Nine different pairs of supply and demand elasticities are reported in table 2.  The 
choice of elasticity pair influences the quantitative results but not the essential story.            20 
4.1 Welfare Analysis of the Quota Transfer Policies 
  The welfare analysis of the transfer assessment policy and the price ceiling 
policies are contained in Table 2 where the value of producer and consumer surplus and 
the in-kind tax revenue are shown for the baseline model and the two policy scenarios for 
nine different pairs of elasticity estimates.  In this discussion we will concentrate on the 
results for the excess supply elasticity of 10 and the excess demand elasticity of -5. 
The results are consistent with expectations.  Under the progressive transfer 
assessment policy consumer surplus declined by $17.9 million and producer surplus by 
$7.9 million in comparison to the baseline figures.  The in-kind tax revenue equals $21.7 
million and the deadweight loss from the policy is $4.1 million.  Hence, the progressive 
transfer assessment policy transfers $21.7 million from the buyers and sellers of quota to 
the general dairy sector at a cost of $4.1 million.  The deadweight loss in the quota 
market represents about 2 percent of the farm cash receipts from the sale of dairy 
products in Ontario in 2007: a non-trivial sum of money (Statistics Canada).  For this 
policy we present three measures of efficiency in Table 2.  The first is the deadweight 
loss divided by the undistorted total economic welfare (producer surplus + consumer 
surplus) which shows that in the base case 7.6 percent of total welfare is lost by levying 
the in-kind tax.  The second is the change in consumer surplus divided by the change in 
producer surplus which shows the relative losses of the buyers and sellers of quota.  This 
ratio, in the base case, is 2.26 showing that the buyers of quota suffer losses more than 
twice as large as the sellers of quota.  Finally, we provide the traditional measure of 
transfer efficiency which in this case is the deadweight loss divided by the in-kind tax 
revenue and it equals $0.19, indicating it costs 19 cents to transfer a dollar of income to   21 
the beneficiaries of the in-kind tax.  Clearly, the beneficiaries of the transfer assessment 
policy are the milk producers remaining in the industry who receive an asset that is worth 
at least $25,500/unit for free, albeit in very small quantities.           
In contrast to the transfer assessment policy under the Price cap system which 
utilizes a price ceiling at $25,500/unit, no tax revenue is collected and there is a direct 
welfare transfer from the sellers of quota to the buyers of quota.  This is clear from the 
negative ratio of the change in consumer surplus divided by the change in producer 
surplus which equals -$0.48 indicating it is costing producers a dollar for every 48 cents 
gained by consumers.  Since the deadweight loss from the price cap and the transfer 
assessment are the same the deadweight loss divided by total welfare remains at 7.6 
percent.  Since this is a policy clearly designed to transfer welfare from quota sellers to 
quota buyers transfer efficiency is defined as the deadweight loss divided by the change 
in consumer surplus.  Table 2 shows this ratio equals 1.08 indicating that it costs $1.08 to 
transfer one dollar to quota purchasers under the price ceiling policy – an extremely 
inefficient policy if this is truly the policy objective.   
Table 2 illustrates that different elasticity combinations result in subtle differences 
in the analysis of the two policies but they do not change the story in any meaningful 
way.  
5.0 Implications for Policy 
The actions of the DFO in attempting to halt the growth in quota values are well 
intended but at the same time they have created new problems and new sources of 
inefficiency.  While the DFO may be able to “ride out” the current stalemate in the quota 
market, the current rules making it uneconomical to purchase an on-going dairy   22 
enterprise, coupled with a price ceiling and the absence of a market based means to 
allocate available supplies on the exchange will seriously inhibit the rationalization of the 
dairy industry.  Of course, if interest rates and/or policy risk begin to rise this might drive 
the equilibrium price of quota below the ceiling price, but the restrictions on sales of on-
going dairies will remain and increase transfer costs that are not captured in our analysis.   
If the DFO wants to lower quota prices there are a number of ways (some radical, 
some not so radical) that this can be done at far lower transaction costs than the current 
policy.  In addition, there are changes that could be made to help the industry compete, if 
and when, it faces more pressure from imported products.   
The first best policy that every economist would mention is to lower the milk 
price.  This would have an immediate impact on rental rates and hence the value of quota.  
However, this would entail a major change in the status quo and would likely require a 
national policy change rather than just an adjustment of policy in Ontario.  It would also 
be interesting to see the impact on quota values if the Canadian Dairy Commission 
announced that it was fixing the target price for milk for the next five years.  This would 
clearly influence the outlook for the growth in the rental rate and also put downward 
pressure on quota values with no decline in nominal milk prices. 
Another option (again in the radical change camp) would be to introduce a tax on 
the sale of all quota, whether through the exchange or as part of an on-going operation.  
This would be a modest tax of, say 2-5 percent.  It would be a fixed tax rate unlike the 
variable tax rate used under the transfer assessment program.  The innovation would be 
for the DFO to sell the quota raised by the tax to producers; but this quota would pay the 
producer a lower price of milk, say 80 percent of the target price.  This would implement   23 
the two-quota scheme discussed in Barichello, Cranfield and Meilke (2009).  As a result 
there would be two classes of quota, one that returns the target price and one that returns 
a price lower price – giving producers an option of which class of quota to purchase.
19  
Over time a lower average milk price and quota value would be established and there 
would be some increase in market demand. 
A third, and less radical, option would be to move back to an unfettered market 
for quota while at the same time relaxing the rules governing the purchase of on-going 
operations.  With interest rates set to rise, and based on the equilibrium quota price we 
calculated for 2007 market clearing prices might soon drop below or close to $25,000.  
At the very least this policy change would remove some of the costly inefficiencies in the 
quota transfer market.  If a “bubble” should develop (although we think this is highly 
unlikely) and “pop” the DFO could say “we told you so”. 
Finally, if the only realistic options are a progressive tax assessment or a price 
ceiling, then the DFO should revert back to the progressive tax assessment.  Imposing a 
strict price ceiling on both sides of the exchange is going to prove impossible to 
rationally allocate quota amongst bidders unless the equilibrium price drops below the 
ceiling price.  We would suggest a three month warning before changing back to the in-
kind tax so that active producers can adjust their decision to account for the policy.    
6.0 Conclusions   
 Our findings suggest that the rapid increase in quota values between 1995 and 
2006 were largely the outcome of market forces (a declining discount rate and policy 
risk) and the relaxation of credit constraints on lending money for quota purchases.  The 
                                                 
19 Operationally the scheme could be operated in the same fashion as when industrial and fluid milk were 
priced differently and had different quotas.   24 
introduction of first a in-kind tax and then a price ceiling in the quota market to halt the 
growth of quota values achieved its objective but at a high cost in terms of inefficiency in 
the quota market.  The status quo (a price ceiling) with no quota being sold on the 
exchange and tight restrictions on the sale of on-going operations does not seem 
sustainable as long as the ceiling price remains binding.  With the ceiling price, even if 
quota is offered for sale on the exchange, it entails the arbitrary distribution of small 
quantities of quota to the many bidders with reservation prices above the price ceiling.  
This stifles the ambitions of those producers wishing to expand their low-cost operations.   
If radical changes in the milk market, such as lowering support prices or creating 
two classes of quota are impossible then it would be better to move back to a tax system 
rather than the current ceiling price.  It is interesting to note that the problems 
surrounding the exchange of quota were studied more than 20 years ago by the well 
known expert on supply management systems Richard Barichello and his student 
Catherine Cunningham-Dunlop (1987).  Their advice is as relevant today as it was in 
1987 (Barichello and Cunningham-Dunlop, p. 223-224): 
The economic effects of these [quota transfer] restrictions are not benign.  In fact, 
when enforced they usually have significant negative effects on the economic 
efficiency of the industry; indeed, generally speaking, the greater the number of 
rules, the less efficient the industry becomes.  The ideal system for managing the 
transfer of farm quotas should be very simple, for reasons of both administrative 
simplicity and industry efficiency. If an efficient industry is to be sought, 
administrators of quota schemes are advised to resist as much as possible any   25 
temptation to achieve too many objectives with their quota regulations or 
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Figure 2: The Welfare Analysis of Supply-Management 
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Figure 4: Welfare in the Milk Quota Market 
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